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Liability of Attorneys, Accountants,
Appraisers, and Other Independent
Contractors Under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989
by
RAYMUND -G. KAWASAXI*
On August 9, 1989, President Bush signed into law the Financial-
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 19891 (FIR-
REA). This far reaching and complex legislation significantly affects
all financial institutions, including banks, thrift-savings and loan-
institutions, and federal credit unions. FIRREA primarily responds,
however, to the deteriorating state of the nation's thrift industry.2
Congress recoghized the existence and magnitude of the thrift in-
dustry's financial crisis.3 The need for legislation became clear when
over twenty-five percent of all federally insured thrifts were reported
to be "insolvent ' 4 or "troubled"s as of December 31, 1988.6 Congress
* Member, Third Year Class; B.S. 1982, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School
of Finance. Recipient of the 1990 Albert G. Evans Award in Private Enterprise for best student
Note in the field of governmental regulation of private enterprise.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified in scattered titles and sections
of U.S.C.).
2. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 307, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONO.
& ADMN. Naws 86, 103 [hereinafter House Report]:
The need for this legislation is clear. The Administration and the Congress must
restore public confidence in the savings and loan industry in order to ensure a safe,
stable, and viable system of affordable housing finance.... [by attempting] to
rectify the flaws in the present structure and regulation of the thrift industry in
order to ensure the problem is never repeated.
3. See, e.g., id. at 302 ("[t]he nation's thrift industry and its deposit insurance fund,
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation are currently in precarious financial
condition and consumer confidence ... is waning"); id. at 304 ("[t]he deteriorating condition
of the thrift industry has overwhelmed the resources of the FSLIC").
4. "Insolvent" thrifts have capital or net worth below zero as measured by Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). As of December 31, 1988, 364 out of 2949 federally
insured thrifts were insolvent under GAAP standards. Id. at 303.
5. "Troubled" thrifts have reported GAAP capital of between zero and three percent
of assets. As of December 31, 1988, 390 out of the 2949 federally insured thrifts were troubled
under GAAP standards. Id.
6. Id.
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further feared that the thrifts were overstating their assets, making the
problem even greater than Congress initially suspected. 7
FIRREA may be the most significant and comprehensive piece
of legislation to impact the regulation of financial institutions since
the 1930s.8 According to the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Af-
fairs Committee,
the primary purposes of [FIRREA] are to provide affordable housing
mortgage finance and housing opportunities for low- and moderate-
income individuals through enhanced management of federal housing
credit programs and resources; establish organizations and proce-
dures to obtain and administer the necessary funding to resolve failed
thrift cases9 and to dispose of the assets of these institutions;'0 es-
tablish a distinction between the regulatory and insurance functions
of the thrift industry by (1) ensuring a well capitalized and inde-
pendent thrift insurance fund," and (2) enhancing thrift industry reg-
ulation by providing for stronger supervisory oversight of the industry
under the Department of Treasury; 2 establish stronger capital [and
liquidity] standards for thrifts; '1 and, enhance the regulatory en-
7. Id.
8. Congress passed several major financial institution acts in the 1930s in response to
the Great Depression of 1933. These acts include the Banking Act of 1933, Act of June 16,
1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)); the Home Owners' Loan Act
of 1933 (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988) (providing for federal chartering of thrift institu-
tions); the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988) (creating the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)); and the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934,
12 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988) (providing for chartering of federal credit unions). Numerous pieces
of legislation have impacted this area in the intervening years. The more significant of these
include the Financial Institution Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 15 of U.S.C.) [hereinafter
FIRA]. See also infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text; the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institution Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of
titles 11, 12, 15 & 20 of U.S.C.); infra note 117 and accompanying text. As discussed
throughout this Note, FIRREA has amended or repealed many parts of these statutes.
9. FIRREA authorized the formation of the Resolution Funding Corporation (REF-
CORP) to provide the primary source of funds to support the resolution of thrift failures.
FIRREA § 511.
10. FIRREA authorized the formation of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to
handle the resolution of all cases involving thrift institutions that previously had been insured
by the FSLIC. Id. § 501.
11. FIRREA abolished the FSLIC and replaced it with the Savings Association Insurance
Fund (SAIF). Id. § 401.
12. FIRREA abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), id. §§ 401, 703,
and replaced it with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), id. § 301, and the Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB), id. § 702. Additionally, FIRREA gave the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the OTS concurrent regulatory oversight power over thrift institutions.
Id. § 912. Since the passage of FIRREA, legislators have discussed combining the OTS with
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC). Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
13. See FIRREA § 301.
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forcement powers4 of the depository institution regulatory agencies
to protect against fraud, waste, and insider abuse.15
FIRREA significantly increases the exposure of attorneys, ac-
countants, appraisers, and other independent contractors providing
services to financial institutions to statutory penalties of unprece-
dented scope and magnitude. As such, FIRREA has been greeted by
these independent contractors with much uncertainty and uneasiness.
This Note focuses on the impact of the enhanced regulatory enforce-
ment provisions of FIRREA and their potential effects on independent
contractors providing services to financial institutions.
Part I will review the statutory predecessors to FIRREA to pro-
vide an understanding of the scope of potential liability under prior
law for attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other independent con-
tractors. Part II will examine the new enforcement provisions under
FIRREA, highlight the significant changes from prior law, and predict
how the new provisions will be applied to independent contractors
based on the legislative history of FIRREA. Finally, Part III will pro-
pose recommendations for attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other
independent contractors providing services to financial institutions to
avoid liability under the new FIRREA provisions. In addition, this
Part will propose an approach that regulatory agencies should follow
when interpreting and implementing the new statute.
I. Status of Law Prior to the Passage of FIRREA
A brief review of the enforcement powers of regulatory agencies
over independent contractors under prior statutory law facilitates a full
appreciation and understanding of the impact of FIRREA's new en-
forcement provisions. 6
Prior to the passage of FIRREA, independent contractors pro-
viding legal, accounting, appraisal, and other services to financial in-
stitutions were subject to potential liability under the enforcement
provisions of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 7 (HOLA), the
National Housing Act of 1934 is (NHA), the Federal Deposit Insurance
14. See id. §§ 901-968.
15. House Report, supra note 2, at 307-08 (emphasis added).
16. For a discussion of the effect of FIRREA on prior law, see infra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text.
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1988), amended by FIRREA §§ 301, 905(0), 907(k). Federally
chartered thrift institutions regulated by the FHLBB were subject to the provisions of HOLA.
18. Id. §§ 1701-1750, amended by scattered sections in FIRREA. Thrift institutions insured
by the FSLIC were subject to the provisions of the NHA. Id. Although HOLA's NHA's
regulatory coverages considerably overlap, the NHA also had regulatory authority over state
chartered thrift institutions (not covered by HOLA) that were insured by the FSLIC. Id.
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Act 19 (FDIA), and the Federal Credit Union Act 20 (FCUA).
A. Parties Potentially Liable Under Prior Law
Under prior law, the reach of regulatory authority extended to
"any [institution] ,21 or any officer, director, employee, agent, or other
person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such associa-
tion."2 Attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other independent
contractors were not mentioned expressly in any of the enforcement
provisions of HOLA, NHA, FDIA, or FCUA. The category of "other
person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such association"
seems sufficiently broad to encompass these independent contractors.
The scarcity of issued regulations or reported judicial decisions, how-
ever, suggests that the regulatory agencies chose to leave this potential
enforcement power largely unexercised. 23 The regulatory agencies typ-
19. Id. §§ 1811-1832, amended by scattered sections in FIRREA. Banks insured by the
FDIC were subject to the provisions of the FDIA. The primary functions of banks and thrifts
were essentially identical-to take in deposits from and provide loans to the general public.
The traditional focus of the thrift industry, however, was more specialized than that of the
banks. Thrifts primarily originated home mortgage loans to promote home ownership. House
Report, supra note 2, at 291. The distinction between banks and thrifts became blurred by
the early 1980s when, as a result of deregulation, the lending and investment powers of thrifts
were liberalized to resemble more closely the lending and investment powers of banks. See id.
at 291-97.
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795 (1988), amended by scattered sections in FIRREA. Federally
chartered credit unions are subject to the provisions of the FCUA. Id. Credit unions provide
many of the same deposit and lending services as their bank and thrift counterparts. Credit
union services, however, are available only to certain defined, closed groups of individuals
sharing a common bond of association. Id. § 1759; M. COBB, FEDERAL REGULATION OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND PROCEDURES, 1.03[4] (1984). (Examples
of such groups include: employees of a particular company, governmental agencies, or non-
profit organizations.) In contrast, the services of banks and thrifts are open to the general
public.
21. Various terms are substituted for "institution" in the different statutes. Cf. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d) (1988) ("association" in HOLA); id. § 1730 ("insured institution" in NHA); id. §
1786 ("insured credit union" in FCUA); id. § 1818 ("insured bank" in FDIA).
22. Id. § 93(b)(1), amended by FIRREA §§ 905(e), 907(e).
23. Attorneys, accountants, and appraisers have been targets of regulatory agencies, such
as the FSLIC and FDIC, for their roles in financial institution failures. Comment, FDIC and
FSLIC Pursuit of Claims Against Officers, Directors, and Others Involved with Failed Lenders,
58 Miss. L.J. 89, 117-19 (1988) (authored by Danny Clearman). Civil actions brought by these
agencies, however, generally have been predicated upon theories of negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and conflict of interest, and not under statutory enforcement provisions. Id.
The federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) also has been used
as a basis for claims against attorneys, accountants, and appraisers. Id. The FHLBB recently
has been involved in 10 suits against public accounting firms alleging negligence in the
performance of audits or the rendering of advice to thrift institutions: a $300 million suit
against Touche Ross & Co. as auditor of Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association of
Mission Viejo, California; a $250 million suit against Deloitte, Haskins & Sells as auditor of
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ically have utilized their statutory enforcement powers under HOLA,
NHA, FDIA, and FCUA instead to pursue financial institutions and
their directors, officers and employees. 24
The legislative history of the financial institution statutes supports
the emphasis on the use of enforcement provisions to curb primarily
insider abuse. The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 197825 (FIRA) added the language "or any officer,
director, employee, agent, or other person participating in the conduct
of the affairs of such association" to the various financial institution
statutes (HOLA, NHA, FDIA, and FCUA). 26 FIRA, a broad based
act, sought a "reform and restructuring of the Nation's financial reg-
ulatory machinery" in light of "highly publicized bank failures and
bank problems extending from the early 1970's."27
In its preliminary investigations into bank failures, the House
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee examined the role
that insider abuse played in many of the bank problems. For example,
the Committee determined that serious insider abuse by the chief ex-
ecutive officer of the United States National Bank of San Diego caused
its failure in 1973.2 The Committee also considered the problems caused
in 1977 by insider dealings of the former Director of the Office of
Sunrise Savings and Loan Association of Boynton Beach, Florida; "a $40 million (at least) suit
against Jeffrey, Palazzola & Co. as auditor of North American Savings and Loan Association
of Orange, California; a $20 million suit against Anderson, Alfred & Ritter as auditor of State
Savings of Salt Lake City, Utah; a $15 million suit against Mike Sage & Co. as auditor of
Ramona Savings & Loan Association of Orange, California; a $10.3 million suit against Cole
& Armbrister as auditor of Mountain Security Savings Bank of Virginia; a $10 million (at
least) suit against Coopers & Lybrand as auditor of CB Financial Corp., which played a role
in the failure of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Shawnee, Oklahoma; a $10
million (at least) suit against Regier, Carr & Monroe as auditor of Savings Investment Services
Corp., a service corporation (analogous to a subsidiary) of OK Federal of El Reno, Oklahoma;
an $8 million suit also against Regier, Carr & Monroe as auditor of Territory Savings and
Loan Association of Seminole, Oklahoma; and a suit with unspecified damages against Grant
Thornton as auditor of Sunbelt Savings Association of Texas. In addition, the FHLBB instituted
a suit against Vanasco & Resnick for alleged fraudulent transactions involving the' failure of
Intercapital Savings Bank of Jacksonville Beach, Florida. FHLBB Takes on Public Accounting
Firms in 11 Lawsuits, Wall Says, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 340 (Feb. 6, 1989); Schachner,
FHLBB Seeks $663 Million from Auditors, Business Insurance, March 20, 1989, at 40.
24. See, e.g., Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1245 (7th Cir.
1986) (suit against bank directors for reimbursement of lost funds under FDIA). For a
discussion of Larimore, see Comment, Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency: Agency
Ordered Liability of Bank Directors and Officers Under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1), 71 MmN. L.
REv. 1035 (1987) (authored by Michelle Culligan).
25. See supra note 8.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(1) (1988), amended by FIRREA §§ 905(e), 907(e).
27. H.R. REP No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEWs 9273, 9279 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1383].
28. Id. at 8.
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Management and Budget, Bert Lance, who served as a Georgia bank
officer. 29 In light of the growing insider abuse problem, and recog-
nizing that "[r]egulatory agencies have often contended that their abil-
ity to control abuses by insiders and to see that financial institutions
are operated in a safe and sound manner are too limited," 30 Congress
included specific provisions in FIRA to expand enforcement powers
of the regulatory agencies. FIRA expanded enforcement powers by
authorizing agencies to issue cease-and-desist orders31 against indivi-
duals,32 bank holding companies,33 and thrift institutions,3 4 and to as-
sess civil money penalties against institutions and individuals.35
Attorneys, accountants, and appraisers are not discussed expressly
in the legislative history of FIRA in connection with Congress' concern
over the growing number of bank failures. This silence, combined with
Congress' emphasis on the effects of insider abuse, leads to the con-
clusion that the language of HOLA, NHA, FDIA, and FCUA, as
amended by FIRA, was aimed primarily at the activities of financial
institution directors, officers, and other insiders, and not at outside
parties such as attorneys, accountants, and appraisers. It is not sur-
prising, then, that there are few if any instances of independent con-
tractors being held liable under the prior laws.
29. Id. at 9. Bert Lance was accused of insider abuse while president of Calhoun First
National Bank of Georgia and, subsequently, National Bank of Georgia. Lance allegedly used
his position as president of these institutions to obtain preferential credit terms from banks
maintaining correspondent relationships with Calhoun First National Bank of Georgia and
National Bank of Georgia. In addition, Calhoun First National Bank of Georgia granted
overdrafts to the Bert Lance Campaign Committee. M. CoBa, supra note 20, 3.01[2].
30. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 27, at 17.
31. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (1988), amended by FIRREA § 902(a). This expansion was
considered necessary because, under prior law, regulatory agencies could issue cease-and-desist
orders only against institutions:
Under present law, the financial institution regulatory agencies may issue a cease-
and-desist order against an institution. In many cases, the agencies have argued, this
may be inappropriate. For example, a bank which is controlled by one major
stockholder who is firmly in control of the day-to-day management of the bank
could be unjustly tainted if a cease-and-desist order is entered against the institution
when the practices which are to be stopped by the order may have been the sole
responsibility of the stockholder.
A more reasonable approach would be to institute cease-and-desist proceedings
against the individual, rather than the bank. [This Act] provides the agencies with
this option.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 27, at 18.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (1988), amended by FIRREA § 902(a).
34. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(C), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(e)(3), repealed by FIRREA
§ 407.
35. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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B. Penalty Provisions Under Prior Law
Although the enforcement provisions of prior law rarely were util-
ized to hold independent contractors liable, it is instructive to review
the prior penalty provisions to provide a basis for contrast with the
significantly expanded penalty provisions of FIRREA.
Several essentially parallel penalty provisions were available under
the various statutes.
(1) Permanent or Temporary Cease-and-Desist Orders
A regulatory agency could institute a permanent cease-and-desist
proceeding 6 for an activity that it found to be an unsafe or unsound
practice37 in conducting the business of an institution; a violation of
a law, rule, regulation, condition imposed by an appropriate agency;
or a breach of any-written agreement between the institution and the
agency.38
Pending its issuance of a permanent order, the regulatory agency
could issue a temporary cease-and-desist order if it determined that
the violation or practice was likely to "cause insolvency ... or sub-
stantial dissipation of assets or earnings of the [financial institution],
or... seriously weaken the condition of the [financial institution] or
* . . seriously prejudice the interests of its [depositors]," 39 and that
such results were likely to occur before the permanent cease-and-desist
proceeding could be completed. 40 The temporary cease-and desist order
was effective immediately upon service of the targeted party.4'
In addition to ordering the violator to cease the violation or prac-
tice in question, both permanent and temporary cease-and-desist or-
ders could require that the relevant party take affirmative action42 to
36. The various regulatory agencies followed identical procedures for instituting cease-
and-desist orders. A summary of the procedures followed by the regulatory agencies is provided
in M. COBB, supra note 20, ch. 3. In general, the procedures for cease-and-desist orders require
first, the issuance by the relevant regulatory agency of a notice of charges specifying the
violations or practices targeted; and second, an administrative hearing not less than 30 nor
more than 60 days after issuance of the notice of charges. Id. 3.02[4].
37. See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(e), repealed by
FIRREA § 407; id. § 1786(e), amended by FIRREA § 902(b); id. § 1818(b), amended by
FIRREA § 902(a) (1988).
39. Id. § 1464(d)(3)(A), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(f)(1), repealed by FIRREA
§ 407; id. § 1786(f)(1), amended by FIRREA § 902(b); "id. § 1818(c)(1), amended by FIRREA
§ 902(a).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The specific scope of the term "affirmative action" was challenged in Larimore v.
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correct the conditions resulting from any violation or unsafe or unsound
practice. 4
3
(2) Prohibition from Participation
A regulatory agency could prohibit" a party from further partic-
ipation in the affairs of an institution if it found that a party's conduct
resulted in substantial financial loss or other damage to the institution,
evidenced personal dishonesty or a willful or continuing disregard for
the institution's soundness, or evidenced the person's unfitness to par-
ticipate in the conduct of the affairs of the institution.
45
(3) Civil Penalties
A regulatory agency could levy a maximum civil penalty 46 of $1,000
per day for violations 47 of final cease-and-desist orders and certain laws.4
Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986), in which the plaintiff successfully
contended that the regulatory agency lacked the authority to order a bank director to reimburse
the bank under its § 1818(b)(1) powers. Id. at 1245. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text; cf. del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1340-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that indem-
nification orders are within regulatory agencies' authority under FIRA's affirmative action
order provision), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
43. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(2)(A), (3)(A), (3)(A) (1988), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. §§
1730(e)(1), (f)(1), repealed by FIRREA § 407; id. §§ 1786(e)(1), (f)(1), amended by FIRREA
§ 902(b); id. §§ 1818(b)(1), (c)(1), amended by FIRREA § 902(a).
44. For summary of the evolution and scope of the agencies' suspension and removal
powers, see M. COBB, supra note 20, ch. 5. The removal and suspension power initially was
granted to regulatory agencies in the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966. Id.
5.01[l], at 5-2. At that time, Congress was concerned that this severe and far-reaching power
would be abused by the agencies and therefore Congress directed the agencies to limit the use
of this power. Id. J 5.01[l][a], at 5-3. The power also was limited to practices involving
personal dishonesty. Id. I 5.01[3][a], at 5-7. In 1978, the amended FIRA liberalized the removal
and suspension power by allowing the agencies to utilize these powers in situations that involved
gross negligence or willful disregard for the safety of the financial institution. Id. at 5-6 to 5-
7. The legislative history of the amended FIRA indicates a decreased level of concern from
that evidenced in 1966 that these powers would be abused by the agencies. Id. at 5-6.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(4) (1988), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(g)(2), repealed
by FIRREA § 407; id. § 1786(g)(2), amended by FIRREA § 903(b); id. § 1818(e)(2), amended
by FIRREA § 903(a).
46. Regulatory agencies were authorized by FIRA to assess civil money penalties against
offending parties. 12 U.S.C. § 504 (1988). For a summary of the civil money penalty
enforcement power, see M. COBB, supra note 20, ch. 4. In general, the civil money penalties
could be assessed pursuant to written notice from the regulatory agency with the opportunity
for an administrative hearing within 20 days of the notice. Id. 4.03[2].
47. Violations include causing, bringing about, participating in, counseling, or aiding or
abetting a violation. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(8)(B)(i) (1988), amended by FIRREA §
301.
48. Id. § 1464(d)(8)(B), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(k)(3)(A), repealed by
FIRREA § 407; id. § 1786(k)(2)(A), amended by FIRREA § 907(b); id. § 1818(i)(2)(1), amended
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(4) Criminal Penalties
A regulatory agency could levy maximum criminal penalties of
a $5000 rfle, a one year prison term, or both could be levied against
a party that previously had been prohibited from further participation
and actually did participate without proper approval of the apprd-
priate agency. 49
Penalty provisions facing independent contractors under prior law
were, therefore, relatively mild. Much of the enforcement power under
prior law focused on the authority of regulatory agencies to issue cease-
and-desist orders, which were used more commonly by regulatory
agencies to sanction financial institutions as opposed to independent
contractors. 0 Other orders prohibited a violator from further partic-
ipation in the affairs of the particular financial institution in question,
but left the violator free to participate in the affairs of other insti-
tutions.5 1 Finally, the magnitude of the monetary penalties-$1000 per
day maximum for civil penalties and $5000 maximum for criminal
penalties-was relatively minor in comparison with the millions of dol-
lars involved in the targeted activities. 52 FIRREA seeks to remedy these
shortcomings by significantly enhancing the penalty provisions facing
violators .53
II. Enforcement Provisions Under FIRREA
FIRREA provides important changes in both the scope of the
regulatory agencies' enforcement powers and the severity and mag-
nitude of the penalty provisions available to them.54
by FIRREA § 907(a). Among the many laws for which violations could give rise to civil
money penalties are: the National Bank Act of 1863, the Federal Reserve Act, the Change in
Control Act, the Bank Holding Company Act, and the Savings and Loan Holding Company
Act. M. COBB, supra note 20, 4.02[21-9].
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(12)(A) (1988), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(p)(1),
repealed by FIRREA § 407; id. § 1786(1), amended by FIRREA § 907(b); id. § 18180),
amended by FIRREA § 908(a).
50. See, e.g., M. COBB, supra note 20, ch. 3, app. 3-3 to 3-6. Cobb notes that from
January 1, 1981 to June 30, 1982 the FHLBB and FSLIC issued twelve cease-and-desist orders.
Id. app. 3-6, at 3-68. Each of the twelve orders was directed toward a thrift institution, its
officers, directors, or employees, or both. Id. app. 3-611]-[8]. During the same time period,
the FDIC, OCC, and FRB issued 272 cease-and-desist orders. Id. app. 3-3 to 3-5. Cobb lists
samples of these cease-and-desist orders, all of which were directed toward a bank or its
insiders. Id.
51. House Report, supra note 2, at 468.
52. In one situation, a bank exceeded its lending limits by more than $1 million. The
borrower eventually was declared bankrupt, resulting in a large loss to the bank. The president
and vice-president of the bank involved in the overextension of credit were fined $5000 and
$10,000, respectively, in civil money 'damages. M. COBB, supra note 20, ch. 4, app. 4-2[1]0].
53. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
54. Under FIRREA, the term "regulatory agencies" implies a vastly revised cast of parties
November 1990]
The parallel enforcement provision structure established under
prior law continues under FIRREA. Congress uniformly extended the
new enforcement standards of FIRREA to all banks and thrift in-
stitutions by abolishing the enforcement provisions previously in effect
for thrift institutions under HOLA and NHA, revising the enforce-
ment standards effective under the FDIA, and extending the revised
enforcement standards of FDIA to both banks and thrift institutions."
Congress also revised the enforcement provisions pertaining to federal
credit unions to make them consistent with the new standards in effect
for banks and thrift institutions. This was accomplished by direct
amendment to FCUA.5 6
A. Parties Potentially Liable Under FIRREA
The FIRREA enforcement standards apply to the "institution-af-
filiated party."5 7 This term replaces "officer, director, agent, or other
person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such associa-
tion,"' 8 used in prior law.
The term "institution-affiliated party" encompasses four general
categories of parties. 59 The first category includes parties that occupy
insider roles in financial institutions such as directors, officers, con-
trolling stockholders, and agents. 6° For FIRREA enforcement pur-
poses, a bank holding company does not constitute a controlling
stockholder. 61
The second category includes all other individuals, in addition to
those included in the first category, who would be required to file a
change-in-control notice 2 with a regulatory agency. 63
The third category comprises non-controlling stockholders (ex-
cluding bank holding companies), consultants, and joint venture part-
from those involved under the prior law. Major regulatory agencies such as the FHLBB and
FSLIC have been abolished and newly created agencies such as the OTS have taken their
place. See supra notes 9-12.
55. FIRREA § 301.
56. Id. § 901(a).
57. "Institution-affiliated party" is defined in FIRREA § 204(u) for banks and thrift
institutions and in § 901(a) for federal credit unions. Id. §§ 204(u), 901(a).
58. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
59. FIRREA §§ 204(u), 901(a).
60. The term "committee member" replaces "controlling stockholder" for federal credit
unions. See id. § 901(a).
61. Id. § 204(u).
62. Change-in-control notices are written notices that must be filed with the appropriate
regulatory agencies prior to the acquisition of a financial institution pursuant to the Change
in Bank Control Act of 1978. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(1) (1988).
63. FIRREA §§ 204(u), 901(a).
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ners. These parties may be subject to the FIRREA enforcement
provisions only if the regulators determine that they actually partic-
ipated in the conduct of the financial institution's affairs.64 The scope
of "participation in the conduct of the affairs of a financial insti-
tution" is not defined in FIRREA and basically mirrors the language
used under prior law. Unfortunately, as noted previously, the en-
forcement powers against non-insiders rarely were exercised. Accord-
ingly, further clarification of the scope of this term must await
development through regulations or case law.
Independent contractors are included in the fourth category of
an institution-affiliated party, which is:
Any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser, or
accountant) who knowingly or recklessly participates in-
(A) any violation s of any law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice, which caused or is likely to cause
more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant adverse effect
on, the insured depository institution.6
FIRREA provides major changes from prior law. First, FIRREA
replaces the previously broad category of "other persons participating
in the conduct of the affairs of the institution" with a specific list of
parties: attorneys, accountants, appraisers, consultants, joint venture
partners, and others. Second, FIRREA requires that a higher level of
culpability be found in order to subject independent contractors to the
new enforcement provisions. Under prior law, all parties were held
to the same level of culpability. 67 The significance of these changes
will be discussed in Part II.C.68
B. Penalty Provisions Under FIRREA
Yet another change from prior law is FIRREA's substantially in-
creased penalty provisions. Institution-affiliated parties, as defined by
64. Id.
65. "Violation" is defined to include "any action (alone or with another or others) for
or toward causing, bringing about, participating in, counseling, or aiding or abetting a
violation." Id. § 204(v).
66. Id. § 204(u)(4).
67. Under prior law, a regulatory agency had to determine first whether a party fell
within the category of "directors, officers, employees, agents, or other persons participating
in the conduct of the affairs of the institution." See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Once the agency determined that a party was covered by the statute, the agency applied the
proper standard of misconduct for the specific penalty provision regardless of whether the
party was an insider or an outside party. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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sections 204(u) and 901(a) of FIRREA, potentially are subject to the
penalties of FIRREA.
(1) Permanent and Temporary Cease-and-Desist Orders
FIRREA expands the regulatory agencies' power to issue cease-
and-desist orders. In particular, FIRREA amends prior law by clar-
ifying the authority of regulatory agencies to issue an order requiring
"an insured depository institution or any institution-affiliated party
to take affirmative action to correct any conditions resulting from any
violation or practice." 69 FIRREA enumerates permissible "affirmative
actions": a regulatory agency may order restitution, reimbursement,
indemnification, or guarantee against loss if the agency determines
that the party involved has been unjustly enriched or that there has
been a reckless disregard for laws, regulations, or prior orders of the
agency. 70 Although prior law granted a regulatory agency the power
to issue orders for affirmative action in conjunction with its cease-and-
desist powers, 71 previous statutes left this power largely undefined.
This gave rise to controversy over the exact scope of the enforcement
power. 72 FIRREA's amendment appears to resolve this controversy.
7
"
The affirmative action category also includes authority to order
certain other actions that are not contingent upon a finding of unjust
enrichment or reckless disregard for laws, regulations, or prior or-
ders. 74 Under this category, regulatory agencies also may issue orders
to: "restrict the growth of the institution; dispose of any loan or asset
involved; rescind agreements or contracts; and employ qualified of-
69. FIRREA § 902(a)(1)(C).
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
72. See id.
73. The House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee noted that
[t]his provision ... overrules the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Larimore
v. Comptroller of the Currency .... The Larimore case has caused confusion in
the banking legal community, especially since the underlying conduct in that case
did not involve unjust enrichment or harm to the institution. This section would
allow such restitution, reimbursement, or indemnification for cases involving unjust
enrichment or reckless disregard by the individual involved.
House Report, supra note 2, at 468.
74. FIRREA § 902(a)(1)(C). A recent case addressed a further controversy over the scope
of this power. In Spiegel v. Ryan, No. 90-3520, 1990 WESTLAW 125672 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
1990), the OTS argued that its power to order corrective affirmative action extended to both
permanent and temporary cease-and-desist orders. The court disagreed, finding that the plain
language of the statute and its legislative history limits the affirmative action power in temporary
case-and-desist orders to prevention of future activities and that corrective action-restitution,
reimbursement, and indemnification-is available only in the context of permanent cease-and-
desist orders. Id. at *4-*5 [references are to WESTLAW star numbers].
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ficers or employees ... ; and take any such other action as the ...
agency determines to be appropriate. 75 An agency may institute these
affirmative action orders upon a finding of unsafe or unsound prac-
tices or violations of laws, rules, regulations, conditions imposed by
regulators, or written agreements between the institution and the agency
-the threshold standard applicable under prior law for such affir-
mative action orders. 76 The distinction made by Congress between the
two classes of affirmative action orders recognizes the potentially se-
vere effects that restitution and reimbursement orders can have on
parties. 77
FIRREA also amends prior law by giving regulatory agencies the
"authority to place limitations on the activities or functions of an in-
sured depository institution or any institution-affiliated party. 7 8
FIRREA substantially eases the requirements for the issuance of
temporary cease-and-desist orders. Under prior law, the regulatory
agency was required to find a substantial dissipation of assets or earn-
ings, a serious weakening of condition, or serious prejudice to de-
positors before a temporary cease-and-desist order could issue.7 9 Under
the FIRREA amendments, only a "significant ' 80 dissipation of assets
75. FIRREA § 902(a)(1)(C).
76. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
77. FIRREA Expands Civil Enforcement Powers of Regulators, Increases Penalties Al-
lowed, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 424, 427 (Sept. 25, 1989) [hereinafter BNA Report]:
The administration's proposed Section 902(a)(3) of Title IX would have defined the
term "affirmative action" to include "reimbursement, restitution, indemnification,
rescission, the disposal of loans or assets, prohibitions or restriction on growth,
guarantees against loss or other appropriate action," including placing limitations
on the activities of an institution-affiliated party. Under this proposed provision, a
regulator could require an institution-affiliated party to make reimbursement or
restitution for, or to indemnify against, losses incurred under any situation.... The
banking industry argued that such a broad grant of administrative authority to the
regulators was inappropriate. In sum, the [American Bankers Association] believed
that this new authority gave the regulators freedom to "micro-manage" institutions,
without following certain procedural safeguards. The American Bankers Association
recommended that the section be amended ... to impose the administrative remedies
of restitution and reimbursement in a final or temporary cease and desist order only
in cases where the person was unjustly enriched or where the violation or criticized
practice involved a reckless disregard for law, applicable regulations, or prior orders.
Id. -at 431.
78. FIRREA § 902(a)(1)(C). The legislative history of FIRREA provides only one example
of this limiting power-restricting an individual's lending authority over certain dollar amounts.
House Report, supra note 2, at 392.
79. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
80. BNA Report, supra note 77, at 432. "The Conference Report indicated that the term
'significant' will lower the burden of proof because it covers 'anything more than a minimal
or nominal dissipation of assets."' Id.
The original administration bill would have called for a deletion of the "substantial"
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or earnings is necessary for issuance of a temporary cease-and-desist
order.81 In addition, the "serious" requirement has been deleted.82 Both
changes will enable regulatory agencies to issue temporary cease-and-
desist orders upon a lesser showing of potential harm.
(2) Prohibition from Participation
FIRREA has revised the criteria for prohibiting83 an individual
from further participation in the affairs of an institution. Under FIR-
REA, a regulatory agency may issue a prohibition order if it deter-
mines that an institution-affiliated party has engaged or participated
in any unsafe or unsound practice, breached a fiduciary duty, or di-
rectly or indirectly violated any law, regulation, final cease-and-desist
order, or (for financial institutions only) any agreement or condition
imposed in writing by a regulatory agency.84
The regulatory agencies' power to issue a prohibition order is sub-
ject to two limitations. First, the agency must find that the practice,
breach, or violation may result or has resulted in the financial insti-
tution's suffering financial loss or other damage, prejudice against the
institution's depositors, or the institution-affiliated party's receiving
financial gain.85
Second, the agency must find that the institution-affiliated party's
conduct involved personal dishonesty or a willful disregard for the
safety and soundness of the financial institution.8 6 Under prior law,
a finding of "substantial" financial loss or other damage was required
for the issuance of a prohibition order.8 7 The House Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs Committee noted that the change would give the
regulators an opportunity to take action before losses reached too great
requirement. Id. at 431. The banking industry opposed this change because "[dieleting the
word 'substantial' would have allowed the agencies to act without having to quantify the
dissipation and could have resulted in potential agency abuse." Id. The banking industry
feared that
[i]mposing temporary cease-and-desist orders, without proving that an institution has
suffered substantial dissipations, could result in bank examiners delaying a decision
on the true condition of the bank. Thus, many institutions might be placed in
"limbo"--prohibited from growing or being forced to sell certain assets or loans.
Id. at 432.
81. FIRREA § 902(a)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i).
82. Id. § 902(a)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(ii).
83. The regulatory agencies also have the power to order removal of a financial institution
officer under the same criteria as the issuance of a prohibition order. Id. § 903(a)(1), (b)(1).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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a level.88 The Committee criticized the "substantial loss" threshold of
prior law because it "resulted in the FDIC's losing cases at an early
stage because the losses were not yet high enough ... or because the
FDIC could not quantify the losses." 89
The prejudicing of the depositor's interest was relevant under prior
law only in the issuance of removal or prohibition orders against of-
ficers or directors of financial institutions. It was not applicable to
other parties such as independent contractors. 90 Prior law required a
finding of "serious" prejudice for the issuance of these orders. 91 FIR-
REA makes this factor relevant for all institution-affiliated parties and
drops the "serious" requirement. 92
Section 904 of FIRREA contains one of the most significant
changes from prior law in the area of prohibition orders. Under prior
law, a prohibition order barred the issued party from participating in
the affairs of the particular institution involved in the violation.9 FIR-
REA, in contrast, provides for an automatic industry-wide prohibition94
on the offending party.95 Thus, institution-affiliated parties such as
attorneys, accountants, and appraisers now face the risk of a complete
ban on retention of financial institution clients, a prospect that could
have potentially devastating economic implications for many firms.
(3) Civil Penalties
FIRREA replaces the single-tier civil penalty structure of prior
law 96 with a three-tier structure utilizing escalating penalty amounts. 97
Under the first tier of monetary civil penalties, FIRREA provides for
a fine of up to $5,000 per day for violations of any law, regulation,
final regulatory agency order, condition, or (for financial institutions
only) written condition or agreement with regulatory agencies.98
The second tier of civil money penalties provides that a fine of
up to $25,000 per day may be levied for any of the violations included
88. See House Report, supra note 2, at 468.
89. Id.
90. 12 U.S.C. § l464(d)(4)(A) (1988), amended by FIRREA § 301; id. § 1730(g)(1),
repealed by FIRREA § 407; id. § 1786(g)(1), amended by FIRREA § 901(b); id. § 1818(e)(1),
amended by FIRREA § 904.
91. Id.
92. FIRREA § 903(a)(1), (b)(1).
93. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
94. The automatic industry-wide prohibition may be waived by written consent of the
regulatory agency. FIRREA § 904(a)(b).
95. Id.
96. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
97. FIRREA § 907.
98. Id.
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in the first tier, for a reckless engagement in an unsafe or unsound
practice in conducting the affairs of the institution, or for a breach
of fiduciary duty. 99 The violation, practice, or breach must involve a
pattern of misconduct, more than a minimal loss to the financial in-
stitution, or pecuniary or other benefit to the offending party.' °°
Third tier civil penalties are the most severe. Fines of up to
$1,000,000 or 1% of total assets (whichever is less) per day may be
levied if an institution-affiliated party knowingly engages in any of
the second tier conduct in addition to knowingly or recklessly causing
a substantial loss to a financial institution or experiencing a substantial
pecuniary gain as a result of its activity. 01
(4) Criminal Penalties
FIRREA provides severe criminal penalties for violations of pro-
hibition or removal orders. 102 Individuals issued these orders who are
convicted for knowingly participating 3 in the affairs of a financial
institution may be fined up to $1,000,000, imprisoned for up to five
years, or both.' °4 Both the potential fine and prison term represent
significant increases over the prior laws' maximum fine of $5000 and
maximum prison term of one year. 05
The civil and criminal enforcement provisions may be imposed
on an institution-affiliated party for up to six years after the party
ceases to participate in the affairs of the financial institution.'06 The
FIRREA enforcement provisions are effective upon enactment of the
statute and may be applied retroactively. 0 7
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 908.
103. FIRREA subjects those involved in knowing participation in any manner, whether
direct or indirect, to the criminal penalty provisions. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
106. FIRREA § 905(a)-(j).
107. Id. The House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee discussed the appli-
cation of the six-year enforcement period and its retroactivity:
Section 905 authorizes the backing agencies to take enforcement actions against
culpable institution-affiliated parties who resign or otherwise depart from an insti-
tution, within six years of their leaving the institution. This section does not create
a new offense; it is procedural in nature, and can therefore be applied retroactively
to yet undiscovered misconduct and to currently pending supervisory matters that
have been stayed awaiting congressional action. For example, assuming that the
'legislation is enacted on August 26, 1989, a banking agency could initiate and pursue
enforcement against any institution-affiliated party who departed an institution in
the previous six years dating back to August 26, 1983.
HousE CoNF. REP. No. 101-222, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 393, 440, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 432, 479.
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FIRREA grants the FDIC oversight authority over thrift insti-
tutions as well as banks. 08 Under this authority, the FDIC may request
that the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) take certain
enforcement actions against thrift institutions.'°9 In the absence of ac-
tion by the OTS within sixty days of the request, the FDIC may initiate
its own enforcement actions."0 The practical effect of having two
agencies with oversight powers will be an increase in the probability
that enforcement actions 'will be initiated.
Regulations interpreting the enforcement provisions of FIRREA
have not been issued yet by the OTS or other regulatory agencies.
C. Analysis of the Impact of FIRREA on Independent Contractors
Since FIRREA was passed, the risk environment in which in-
dependent contractors serving financial institutions must operate has
become decidedly more volatile. For the first time, attorneys, ac-
countants, and appraisers specifically have been named as falling within
the reach of the regulatory agencies' enforcement powers. It is too
early to ascertain whether the specific inclusion of attorneys, ac-
countants, and appraisers in the institution-affiliated party category
will increase the number of regulatory enforcement actions against
such parties. There has been speculation, however, that the new en-
forcement provisions will give the regulatory agencies "marching or-
ders" to pursue lawyers and accountants and that a "new deep pocket"
'has emerged from which the government will try to recoup some of
the losses suffered by failed financial institutions."'
A year following the enactment of FIRREA, this premonition
appears to be coming into fruition. In an August 1990 federal court
ruling involving Charles Keating and the failed Lincoln Savings and
Loan Association, district court Judge Stanley Sporkin criticized at
length the role of attorneys and public accountants (not parties to the
suit) in the Lincoln failure and the savings and loan crisis in general.1 2
108. FIRREA § 912.
109. Id.
I10. Id.
111. Marcotte, Lawyer S&L Malpractice, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 24 (comments of Roger
Greenfield, a financial transactions litigation expert).
112. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, Nos. 89-1318 & 89-1323, 1990 WESTLAW
123931 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1990) (to be reported at 743 F. Supp. 901). Charles Keating was the
chairman and chief executive officer of American Continental Corporation (ACC) based in
Phoenix, Arizona. ACC acquired Lincoln Savings and Loan Association of Irvine, California
in 1984. Under the control of ACC, Lincoln began to engage in high risk investment and
lending practices. In addition, ACC also allegedly siphoned funds out of Lincoln through
various allegedly fraudulent transactions. In April 1989, the FHLBB placed Lincoln, now in
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In concluding that the FHLBB acted properly in placing Lincoln into
conservatorship and subsequently into receivership, Judge Sporkin ex-
pressed dismay and surprise that experts, such as the CPA firm re-
tained by Lincoln, were unable or unwilling to take appropriate action
in preventing the insolvency of Lincoln." 3 He noted that
this [c]ourt believes far too little scrutiny has been focused on the
private sector ... [which] ought to be able to put in place a system
that would prevent the kind of excesses that took place in Lincoln
from recurring. Here it is clear the private sector was not willing to
cooperate with the public oversight regulators. Indeed, the private
sector at times impeded the regulatory authorities from discharging
their duties." 4
Timothy Ryan, Director of the OTS, immediately followed up on
Judge Sporkin's ruling by announcing that the OTS views the ruling
as "powerful ammunition to launch a major round of enforcement
actions against lawyers, accountants, and other professionals involved
serious financial trouble, into conservatorship. In August 1989, the FHLBB concluded that
Lincoln was insolvent and replaced the conservator with a receiver. Charles Keating, through
ACC and Lincoln, then filed suit against Danny Wall as Director of the OTS (the successor
to the FHLBB) alleging that the actions taken by the regulatory agency were unwarranted.
The District Court for the District of Columbia found in favor of the OTS on all counts. Id.
at *16 [reference is to WESTLAW star number].
In September 1990, Charles Keating and three other executives of Lincoln and ACC were
indicted on criminal fraud charges in a Los Angeles superior court. At that time, the United
States government estimated that the Lincoln bailout would cost over two billion dollars and
would be the largest savings and loan failure to date. San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 19, 1990,
at A-11, col. 1.
113. Judge Sporkin noted that
[t]his [c]ourt was quite surprised by those [accounting] experts' rationalization which
supported [Lincoln's] position as to the appropriate accounting for this transaction.
To be generous to the position expounded by [these experts], the [c]ourt will attribute
the position they took to the abstract application of accounting principles .... [T]he
accountants have been aware of the true facts for many months now and have taken
no steps to disassociate themselves from the transaction, and indeed have attempted
to rationalize before this [c]ourt the propriety of the actions they took in allowing
the transactions to be booked as it was.
Lincoln, 1990 WESTLAW 123931, at *10 (footnote omitted). Judge Sporkin continued by
noting that Keating was surrounded by "scores of accountants and lawyers" and that this
raised several "unanswered questions" regarding the role of both in-house and outside lawyers
and accountants in the Lincoln case:
Where were [the lawyers and accountants] . .. when these clearly improper trans-
actions were being consummated? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate
themselves from the transaction? Where also were the outside accountants and
attorneys when these transactions were effectuated? What is difficult to understand
is that with all the professional talent involved (both accountants and legal), why at
least one professional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching
that took place in this case ....
Id. at *17.
114. Id.
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in thrift failures." ' 5 OTS Chief Counsel Harris Weinstein added that
"[w]e intend to move against those responsible professionals in a very
vigorous way."1" 6 The strong language adopted by the court and the
OTS would appear to indicate that the "marching orders" have been
issued and that a new target for regulatory enforcement action has
come into focus.
The potential impact of FIRREA on attorneys, accountants, and
appraisers also can be assessed by examining the changes in the en-
forcement activity of regulatory agencies during the time period fol-
lowing the passage of FIRA in 1978. Subsequent to the passage of
FIRA and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982'-
another act that increased the enforcement powers of regulatory
agencies' 8-the average annual number of formal enforcement actions
by the Comptroller of the Currency for the years 1981-1983 exceeded
the total number of these actions during the entire 1971-1976 period."19
In 1982 the FSLIC increased its cease-and-desist proceedings by 400
percent, its removal of directors and officers by 100 percent, and its
criminal referrals by fifty percent.120 Commentators attribute this in-
crease in activity to three factors: the passage of the stricter enforce-
ment laws in 1978 and 1982, an increase in financially troubled
institutions, and a decision in regulatory philosophy to "get tough." 2'
Similarly, the passage of FIRREA should result in an increase in
enforcement activity in the post-1989 period, particularly targeting at-
torneys, accountants, and appraisers. The factors that led to an in-
crease in enforcement activity in the post-FIRA period also exist in
the post-FIRREA period. In addition to the stricter enforcement pro-
visions contained in FIRREA, the magnitude of the financial insti-
tution failures (particularly thrifts) has increased' 22 and a "get tough"
philosophy on attorneys, accountants, and appraisers has been dic-
tated by the Bush administration 23 and Congress. 24 Given this sim-
115. OTS Sees Keating Ruling as Ammunition for Major Round of Enforcement Actions,
55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 399, 399 (Sept. 10, 1990).
116. Id.
117. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of titles 11,
12, 15 & 20 of U.S.C.).
118. See supra note 8.
119. Vartanian & Schley, Bank Officers and Director Liability-Regulatory Actions, 39,
Bus. LAw. 1021, 1021 (1984).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1021-22.
122. House Report, supra note 2, at 302-07.
123. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
124. The legislative history of FIRREA acknowledges Congress' belief that "[a]ppraisers,
accountants, and attorneys have participated in some of the serious misconduct in banks and
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ilarity of conditions, one may expect that enforcement activity during
the early 1990s will parallel the increased enforcement activity of the
early 1980s.
The expected higher scrutiny of attorneys, accountants, apprais-
ers, and other independent contractors by regulatory agencies in con-
junction with the severity of FIRREA's newly revised penalty provisions
renders running afoul of any regulation dangerous. Attorneys, ac-
countants, and appraisers now face the risk of losing their entire fi-
nancial institution client base 125 or paying enormous fines of up to
$1,000,000 per day. 26 Independent contractors, however, should con-
sider certain factors, which will tend to mitigate these increased risks.
There is clear legislative intent that attorneys, accountants, ap-
praisers, and other independent contractors are to be subjected to the
severe penalty provisions of FIRREA for only the most serious mis-
conduct. 27 Only "knowing" or "reckless" actions by independent
contractors are to be punishable. 28 This departs from prior law, which
held all parties found to be an "officer, director, employee, agent,
or other person participating in the conduct of the affairs of the in-
stitution" to the same standard of conduct depending on the en-
forcement power sought to be enforced. 129 Under FIRREA, regulatory
agencies will be required to find a higher level of culpability to hold
independent contractors liable. Consequently, it will be more difficult
for regulators to penalize independent contractors as opposed to in-
siders under FIRREA, the practical effect of which will be that of-
ficers, directors, and other insiders will remain the primary targets of
regulatory agencies.
Another factor that should mitigate independent contractors' risks
stems from FIRREA's legislative history. Although FIRREA is silent
on the matter, its legislative history indicates congressional intent to
protect firms from the reckless or knowing misconduct of their em-
ployees. These firms have been placed beyond the reach of the FIR-
thrift institutions." House Report, supra note 2, at 466.
Congress specified certain professions in order to "draw the banking agencies' attention to
certain categories of persons and to support application of the agencies' enforcement authority
over them." Id. Congress expressly noted that "other unspecified independent contractors" in
addition to attorneys, accountants, and appraisers were also covered by FIRREA. Id.
125. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
127. The legislative history indicates that "[FIRREA] places limitations on the banking
agencies, so that they cannot utilize their enforcement authority over independent contractors
for necessarily the same misconduct, abuse, or violations which can give rise to enforcement
orders against officers, directors, and employees of financial institutions." House Report,
supra note 2, at 466.
128. FIRREA §§ 204(u), 901(a).
129. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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REA provisions. 130 Responding to "concern[s of the American Bar
Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
and other groups] ... that a banking agency could obtain enforce-
ment orders against a corporation, firm, or partnership, such as a large
accounting, appraisal, or law firm,''3 the House Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs Committee stated that it expected "the banking
agencies to limit enforcement actions in the usual case, to individuals
who have participated in the wrongful action, to prevent unintended
consequences or economic harm to innocent third parties.' ' 32 The
Committee also noted that regulatory agencies should apply the FIR-
REA penalty provisions to law, accounting, or appraisal firms only
in instances in which "most or many of the managing partners or
senior officers" were involved in the misconduct. 133 Absent this finding
of managerial or executive involvement, only the individuals actually
involved in the misconduct should be subjected to the FIRREA penalty
provisions. 134
FIRREA's legislative history affords an additional level of pro-
tection specifically for attorneys. The House Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs Committee indicated that regulators should not impose
liability on attorneys whose legal advice in an unclear area of law later
results in a violation of law if the legal advice was offered in good
faith:
lAin attorney who provides legal advice or other legal services in
good faith to a financial institution may counsel the institution that
a particular course of action is lawfully justifiable, because of unclear
law or regulations or because the institution may succeed on a legal
challenge to the law or regulation during an administrative or judicial
proceeding. That such advice or services may conflict with the po-
sition of the federal banking agency and that a court may determine
that position to be wrong would not usually or necessarily show bad
faith. 135
Providing this type of legal advice in good faith should not even con-
stitute "participation" for the purposes of determining whether an
130. House Report, supra note 2, at 466-67.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. For example, a removal and prohibition order might be justified against the local
office of a national accounting firm if it could be shown that a majority of the
managing partners or senior supervisory staff participated directly or indirectly in
the serious misconduct to an extent sufficient to give rise to an order. Such an order
might well be inappropriate if it was taken against the entire national firm or other
geographic units of the firm, unless the headquarters or these units were shown to
have also participated, even if only in a reviewing capacity.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 467.
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attorney has "knowingly or recklessly participated" in the alleged mis-
conduct. 3 6 This exception apparently is intended to protect the at-
torney-client relationship. 137
The legislative history does not mention extending this protection
to other professionals providing services to financial institutions. For
instance, it is not clear whether a CPA's good faith business advice
to a financial institution client, which later results in a violation, would
be entitled to the same level of protection. Although this inconsistent
treatment may be partially attributable to a strong lobbying effort by
the American Bar, the disparity also may be explained by the tra-
ditional status of communications made within attorney-client rela-
tionships. Courts historically have been willing to afford a high level
of protection to these communications, for example by preserving the
attorney-client privilege, to enhance the free flow of information be-
tween an attorney and client, and to maintain the adversary system
of adjudication. 3 8 Communications in an accountant-client relation-
ship have not received commensurate protection. 13 9 This disparate
treatment indicates an attitude that communications or advice re-
garding legal matters deserve greater guarantees of protection than
communications with accountants, which relate primarily to business
or tax issues. These distinctions may explain Congress' failure to in-
clude other categories of independent contractors within the "good
faith" exception.
Another possible explanation for Congress' reluctance to extend
the "good faith" exception to accountants is its belief that public ac-
countants have played a significant role in the savings and loan crisis
and therefore deserve a lower level of protection than attorneys.140 The
House Committee alleged that CPAs "mask[ed] the insolvency of many
failed thrifts, and often did not report fraud and insider abuse by thrift
managements to thrift regulators,' 141 and that there was "a lack of
professionalism and poor quality audit work by CPA's." 42 The House
Committee also noted that "[iun a study of failed S&L's under the
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See FED. R. EvID. 950-962; J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, EVIDENCE 493-565 (6th ed. 1988).
139. "At common law there was no testimonial privilege for communications between a
man and his accountant, and courts continue to reject this claim of privilege unanimously."
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for
the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1247 (1962).
140. The House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee noted that "the public
accounting industry and certified public accountants (CPAs) played a major role" in the
savings and loan crisis. House Report, supra note 2, at 301.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas, the [General
Accounting Office] reported, 'For six of the eleven failed S&L's we
reviewed, CPA's did not adequately audit or report the S&L's fi-
nancial condition or internal control problems in accordance with pro-
fessional standards.' 1 43
Although independent contractors, particularly attorneys, will
benefit from the additional protections afforded in FIRREA's legis-
lative history, the same may not be true of appraisers. Congress, rec-
ognizing the significant contribution that faulty appraisals have made
to the current savings and loan crisis, has targeted appraisers for a
higher level of scrutiny than other independent contractors.144 Title XI
of FIRREA authorizes the regulatory agencies to develop new uniform
national appraisal standards. 145
The OTS, OCC, FDIC, and RTC recently have issued final rules
requiring appraisals on all real estate transactions meeting at least a
$50,000 de minimus level.'4 State-licensed appraisers may be used on
all transactions below $250,000 and on "non-complex"' 47 one-to-four-
family residential property transactions up to $1,000,000.141 In re-
sponse to FIRREA's authorization to develop national appraisal stan-
dards, the regulatory agencies now require that the appraisals must
be performed in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Profes-
sional Appraisal Practice issued by the Appraisal Foundation. 49 Na-
tional appraisal standards will require appraisers desiring to service
financial institutions to conform to more stringent and technical re-
143. Id. These findings were based partly on hearings held before the House Committee
in early 1989. See Failure of Independent CPA's to Identify Fraud, Waste, and Mismanagement
and Assure Accurate Financial Position of Troubled S&L's: Before the House Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
144. Extensive Congressional hearings, GAO reports and regulatory agency studies
have documented the pervasive use of faulty and fraudulent real estate appraisals
by unscrupulous thrift managements. Thrift regulations require a lender to get
property appraised before being permitted to grant a loan on certain real estate
projects. An appraisal is supposed to protect thrifts against losses by ensuring that
collateral backing the loan is properly valued. Faulty appraisals make unsafe and
unsound real estate loans appear adequately collateralized. Collusion between thrift
managers, real estate appraisers and borrowers has cost the FSLIC billions of dollars.
House Report, supra note 2, at 311.
145. FIRREA §§ 1101-1122.
146. OCC, FDIC, RTC, OTS Adopt Appraisal Rules with $50,000 De Minimus Level, 55
Banking Rep. (BNA) 329 (Aug. 27, 1990).
147. A complex residential real estate transaction is one in which the property to be
appraised, the form of ownership, or market conditions are "atypical." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. For an extended discussion of the FIRREA real estate appraisal provisions, see
Vickory, Regulating Real Estate Appraisers: The Role of Fraudulent and Incompetent Real
Estate Appraisals in the S&L Crisis and the FIRREA Solution, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1990).
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quirements. These standards also will reduce uncertainty about the
level of performance that the regulatory agencies will expect of ap-
praisers under the new FIRREA enforcement standards. Presumably,
compliance with the national standards will shield appraisers from li-
ability under the FIRREA enforcement standards.
In summary, FIRREA significantly has expanded the scope and
magnitude of regulatory enforcement powers. Prior law focused this
enforcement power on directors, officers, and employees; ' ° a contin-
uation of this policy, however, should not be expected under FIR-
REA.' 5' Instead, independent contractors should be aware of the
various standards required by FIRREA and the magnitude of the pen-
alties that may be levied for violations of these standards. 5 2 Inde-
pendent contractors also should be aware of various protections
contained in FIRREA that may serve to shield them from liability. 53
These protections, however, are not entirely consistent among the var-
ious types of independent contractors.154
I. Proposed Recommendations
The significant changes in enforcement powers established by
FIRREA present special challenges to both independent contractors
providing services to financial institutions and the regulatory agencies
empowered to police the conduct of the independent contractors. In
light of the onerous FIRREA enforcement provisions, attorneys, ac-
countants, appraisers, and other professionals must carefully balance
their commitments to provide effective and high quality services to
their financial institution clients with the risks of running afoul of the
FIRREA rules. Given the recent passage of FIRREA and the con-
sequent lack of regulations, judicial decisions, or other guidance re-
garding the new enforcement provisions, the regulatory agencies are
faced with the difficult task of interpreting and implementing the new
standards.
Presently, the actual application of the provisions by the regu-
latory agencies is uncertain. For example, FIRREA authorizes civil
penalties of up to $1,000,000 per day for certain serious misconduct.'55
150. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 111-124 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 54-110 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 127-149 and accompanying text.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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It is unclear, however, whether regulatory agencies ever will levy such
a severe and extreme sanction or whether they will be content to rely
primarily on the deterrent effect of such a penalty. The resolution of
uncertainties will determine the appropriate actions that independent
contractors must take. This Part first will propose the procedures that
independent contractors should follow in light of the uncertainties sur-
rounding FIRREA enforcement provisions. This Part then will pro-
pose an approach that regulators should take in interpreting and
implementing the new standards.
A. Independent Contractors
Attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other independent con-
tractors who currently are serving financial institution clients, or in-
tend to do so in the future, should reevaluate their internal quality
control procedures to guard against potential FIRREA enforcement
problems. For purposes of this Note, internal quality control pro-
cedures are a set of procedures designed to regulate and monitor the
ongoing operations of the independent contractor's organization to
achieve a desired level of work quality. In instances when the desired
level of quality is not achieved, the procedures should provide the in-
dependent contractor with prompt identification of the deficiency. In
reevaluating their procedures, independent contractors should consider
each of the standards delineated for independent contractors in sec-
tions 204(u) and 901(a) of FIRREA and adjust their procedures ac-
cordingly. Unfortunately, FIRREA standards pertaining to independent
contractors are replete with vague and ambiguous terminology that
may impede the development of internal quality control procedures.
(1) The "Knowing or Reckless" Participation Standard
Under FIRREA, independent contractors may be liable only for
"knowing" or "reckless" conduct. 156 The precise definition of know-
ing or reckless conduct does not appear in FIRREA's legislative his-
tory. Moreover, this standard did nbt exist under the prior regulatory
enforcement statutes. Although stopping short of requiring intent, this
standard will insulate independent contractors from FIRREA liability
for merely negligent conduct. Presumably regulators still may institute
lawsuits against independent contractors based on a common law neg-
ligence cause of action.
156. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
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The "knowing" and "reckless" standard of conduct has been
variously defined in both tort and criminal law.5 7 It is difficult to
predict which of the various constructions the regulatory agencies will
use or whether they will adopt different applications for the imposition
of civil and criminal penalties. The level of culpability required by the
regulators, however, should rise to at least that of "gross negligence"
as evidenced by an unreasonable disregard of the risk that one of the
prohibited actions' 58 will occur. A lower level would circumvent Con-
gress' intent to hold independent contractors liable only for "serious
misconduct." 5 9
A logical step in the search for a workable definition of "know-
ing" and "reckless" is to look at other fields in which statutory li-
ability may be imposed on independent contractors. Perhaps the most
significant area that exposes independent contractors to statutory li-
ability is the field of securities law. Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933160 imposes liability on professionals (specifically naming ac-
countants, engineers, and appraisers) who prepare or certify any part
of a registration statement that contains "an untrue statement of fact"
or that "omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein.''6
Unlike FIRREA, the Securities Act does not establish standards of
conduct using the terms "knowing," "reckless," or "negligent." In-
stead, section 11 imposes liability on independent contractors who,
after being subjected to a reasonable investigation, did not have rea-
157. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft 1985) (criminal law construction):
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances,
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS 213 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton, D. Owen 5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) (tort law construction):
The usual meaning assigned to . . . "reckless" . . . is that the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk
that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which
thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences.
158. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988).
161. Id. § 77k(a) (1988).
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sonable grounds to believe that the registration statement was true or
that there were no material omissions, but who, nevertheless, believed
in the truth or completeness of the statement. 162 Section 11 (c) defines
"reasonable investigation" and "reasonable ground for belief" as the
standard "required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property.' 1 63 In addition, unlike FIRREA, once a registration state-
ment is found to be misleading, the burden of proof switches to the
independent contractor to prove that she performed her duties with
due diligence. 64 Similar burden-shifting provisions are not contained
in the FIRREA enforcement provisions.
The Securities Act of 1933, therefore, appears to apply a neg-
ligence standard to independent contractors while FIRREA requires
"knowing" or "reckless" conduct, a substantially higher level of cul-
pability. The independent contractor may rebut the presumption of
negligence under securities law by showing due diligence. 165 This sug-
gests that independent contractors involved in securities engagements
may be able to develop effective internal control procedures to guard
against FIRREA liability by extending their due diligence procedures
used in securities engagements to the services they provide to financial
institution clients.
(2) The Law Violation, Fiduciary Breach, or Unsound Practice Standard
Under FIRREA, the "knowing" or "reckless" conduct must per-
tain to one of three actions: a violation of a law or regulation, a breach
of fiduciary duty, or an unsafe or unsound practice. 66 "Violation of
law or regulation" appears to be a relatively unambiguous term.
"Breach of fiduciary duty" and "unsafe and'unsound practices,"
however, both suffer from the same legislative and judicial vagueness
problems as the "knowing" or "reckless" standard of conduct im-
posed by FIRREA. "Nearly every enforcement statute available to
banking agencies"' 6 7 contains terms like "unsound banking prac-
tices," but "Congress has never defined [these terms] ."168 Judicial in-
162. R. CLAK, CoRAO TE LAW 745 (1986).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1988).
164. Id. § 77k(b). An examination of what constitutes due diligence under securities law
is beyond the scope of this Note.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
167. Comment, supra note 23, at 110 n.155 (citing Comment, Gulf Federal Saving & Loan
v. FHLBB: A New Judicial Attitude Toward the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 31
BuAao L. REv. 233, 240 (1982)).
168. Id.
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terpretations of these statutory terms have been equally vague. 69
Most of the litigation and instances of regulatory actions con-
cerning "unsafe and unsound practices" have focused on the activity
and practices of the financial institution itself. Practices that have re-
sulted in regulatory action in the past include: excessive management
compensation, insider loans, inadequate record keeping, and incom-
plete loan and credit files. 70 There has been little or no discussion of
the concept of "unsafe or unsound practices" as it relates to the op-
erations of the independent contractor. The court in the recent Lincoln
Savings and Loan ruling' 7' may have provided some guidance to ac-
countants in determining whether a practice is unsafe or unsound for
FIRREA enforcement purposes. Judge Sporkin in the Lincoln ruling
expressed his belief that
an accountant must not blindly apply accounting conventions without
reviewing the transaction to determine whether it makes any eco-
nomic sense and without first finding that the transaction is realistic
and has economic substance that would justify the booking of the
transaction that occurred. Moreover, they should be particularly
skeptical of any transaction where the audit trail is woefully lacking
and the audited entity has failed to comply with the record keeping
requirements established by a federal regulatory body.17 2
Independent contractors must be aware of the types of financial
institution activity that have been found to be "unsafe or unsound"
in the past because FIRREA extends liability to participation by in-
dependent contractors in such activities. 7 1
169. "The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the term to be restricted
to 'practices with a reasonably direct effect on an association's financial soundness."' Id.
(citing Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982)). In a recent OTS action against a former CEO and chairman
of a California savings and loan, Timothy Ryan, Director of OTS, issued an order charging
the former officer with engaging in unsafe and unsound practices. The order noted that the
effects of such practices "are likely to weaken the condition of [the institution], or otherwise
prejudice the interests of [the institution's] depositors." Spiegel v. Ryan, No. 90-3520, 1990
WESTLAW 125672, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1990).
"Breach of fiduciary duty" is "a very broad term embracing both technical fiduciary
relations and those informal relations which exist wherever one ... trusts in or relies upon
another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979). In the context of financial institution
enforcement actions, the term has been applied commonly to directors and officers of the
institution. Comment, supra note 23, at 104-05 (footnote omitted). Independent contractors,
however, also have been sued by regulatory agencies and shareholders of financial institutions
under a common law breach of fiduciary duty theory. Id. at 117-18, 117 n.216.
170. M. COBB, supra note 20, 3.02[4][c][ii].
171. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
172. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, Nos. 89-1318 & 89-1323, 1990 WESTLAW
123931 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1990) (to be reported at 743 F. Supp. 901).
173. FIRREA § 901(a). For example, assuming that a regulatory agency establishes that
an attorney meets the requisite culpability level, the attorney possibly may be liable under
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(3) Standards Regarding the Level of Harm to the Institution
FIRREA requires that the misconduct of an independent con-
tractor must result in "more than a minimal financial loss"' 174 or "a
significant adverse effect" 17 on the financial institution.
Here again, both terms are vague and attempts to quantify these
terms are difficult because the standard likely will fluctuate with the
size of the institution, financial stability of the institution, and other
variables. In reality, however, once regulators find a "knowing" or
"reckless" act resulting in a "violation, breach, or unsafe or unsound
practice," a low standard such as "more than a minimal financial
loss" probably will provide little protection to the independent con-
tractor.
Given the inclusion of such vague requirements, one legitimately
could observe that the only certainty inherent in the FIRREA en-
forcement standard relating to independent contractors is that FIR-
REA covers attorneys, accountants, and appraisers. Currently, absent
the issuance of regulations or judicial decisions providing additional
guidance, independent contractors can best protect themselves against
potential liability under FIRREA by concentrating on avoiding the
"knowing or reckless participation" element.176 The rationale behind
such an approach is twofold. First, this element is most directly within
the control of independent contractors and, accordingly, is the element
for which internal quality control procedures most easily can be de-
veloped. Second, if the regulatory agency does not find the requisite
level of culpability, then vague factors, such as whether a violation,
breach, or unfair practice has occurred and whether the institution has
suffered a "significant adverse effect," become irrelevant.
Undoubtedly, many large law and accounting firms already have
extensive internal control procedures to protect against malpractice
suits based on negligence causes of action. These procedures conform
with FIRREA requirements as well because FIRREA does not penalize
independent contractors' conduct that rises merely to the level of neg-
ligence. Therefore, the actual impact of FIRREA on the daily op-
erations of large law and accounting firms may be less than originally
anticipated. The magnitude of the potential penalties available under
FIRREA, however, are so significant that even these large firms should
FIRREA for providing advice on the development of an executive compensation plan that the
agency finds excessive.
174. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.
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reevaluate their internal control procedures for possible weaknesses.
All firms, especially those that do not possess a high level of control
procedures and hence are at greater risk, should consider certain con-
trol procedures.
(4) Financial Institution Committees as a Control Procedure
Firms should consider establishing an internal committee to re-
view and monitor all ongoing financial institution projects and ap-
prove all completed projects, for example, attorney opinion letters,
audit reports, and appraisal reports, prior to releasing them to cli-
ents. 17 7 In formulating specific standards to be used in performing its
review, the committee should consider some or all of the following
factors: whether all necessary levels of review were performed prior
to submission to the committee; whether there is adequately docu-
mented evidence of the planning process and work performed on the
engagement; and whether there is documented evidence of checks for
compliance with relevant laws, accounting standards, or appraisal
standards.
Firms with securities engagements may consider extending some
of the due diligence procedures used in their securities engagements
to their financial institution engagements.'7 Because the due diligence
procedures are designed to guard against liability under the lower neg-
ligence culpability level of the Securities Act of 1933, similar proce-
dures will provide equal or more effective protection against liability
under FIRREA. The committee would monitor these due diligence
procedures. The committee also would monitor and keep abreast of
developments and changes in the industry environment, laws, and re-
gulations. Delegating these functions to a committee would minimize
the risk that the regulators will find the conduct of the independent
contractor to have reached the requisite "reckless" culpability level.
Indeed, the very existence of such a committee and of formalized re-
view policies should mitigate a finding of recklessness on the part of
the independent contractor.
One potential risk of establishing a committee, however, may be
that it extends the potential reach of the regulators from the individual
committing the alleged misconduct to the entire firm or local office. 79
Regardless, as a practical matter regulatory actions taken against an
177. A thorough exploration of the specific standards to be used by the committee in
performing their review is beyond the scope of this Note.
178. See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
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individual likely will have adverse consequences against the entire firm
in terms of lost revenues and unfavorable publicity. In addition, even
if the firm cannot be reached for the reckless conduct of its members
under the FIRREA provisions, common law fraud or malpractice ac-
tions are available to the regulators as an alternative to bringing suit
against the firm under the statute. 180 Another potential disadvantage
of establishing a committee is the financial expense of creating and
maintaining a committee. Perhaps the greatest possible expense is the
time commitment to the financial institution committee-time that
otherwise could be billed to clients. Given the current uncertainties
inherent in FIRREA and the large penalties at stake, however, firms
may find that the benefit of the added protection supplied by a com-
mittee outweighs its costs.
(5) Screening Potential Financial Institution Clients as a Control
Procedure
Under the increased enforcement powers of FIRREA, independ-
ent contractors serving financial institution clients should screen all
potential clients carefully to assess the risks involved with particular
clients. The client's financial position, lending practices, and man-
agement philosophy should be evaluated carefully to assess potential
risks. For example, the independent contractor should consider whether
the client's lending practice is to pursue lower risk residential mortgage
loans or higher risk commercial loans. Another relevant consideration
is whether the client seeks to achieve rapid growth or slower, steady
growth. Independent contractors also should investigate past action
taken by regulatory agencies against the potential client and determine
whether the reasons for the action still exist, or whether the individuals
involved are still present. In addition, independent contractors con-
sidering an engagement with a new client should inquire if and why
the potential client disengaged its previous independent contractor.
The independent contractor may institute other control proce-
dures depending on its level of tolerance for risk in this area. In gen-
eral, given the large penalties that may be levied against them,
independent contractors should exercise extreme caution while await-
ing clarification of the FIRREA standards.
B. Regulatory Agencies
Regulatory agencies have tremendous discretion in interpreting
and implementing FIRREA because of the vague standards included
180. See supra note 23.
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in the FIRREA enforcement provisions. Indeed, Congress may have
purposely drafted the statute using vague standards to afford the re-
gulators a significant amount of flexibility in dealing with situations
as they arise. Nevertheless, this Part argues that regulators should give
the provisions a restrictive interpretation, applying FIRREA's en-
forcement powers against independent contractors only for the most
serious violations. Regulators should not consider FIRREA as con-
ferring carte blanche to pursue independent contractors for anything
less than misconduct of the most serious nature. In addition, regu-
lators should exercise discretion in levying the excessive penalties avail-
able under FIRREA. For example, use of civil money penalties
approximating $1,000,000 or industry-wide prohibition orders should
be used sparingly by the regulators. The overall objectives of FIRREA,
the change in environment from that under prior law, and the leg-
islative history of FIRREA justify such a position.
(1) Regulating Under the Overall Objectives of FIRREA
The overall objectives of FIRREA are to resolve the savings and
loan crisis and restore public confidence in the industry. 8' Regulators
should keep this overall objective in mind when dealing with inde-
pendent contractors. An overly expansive and liberal application of
the FIRREA standards will increase the perceived risk to independent
contractors in providing services to financial institutions. This may
discourage independent contractors from accepting such engagements
and inhibit the level of service provided to financial institution clients.
Financial institutions, especially those that are failing or troubled,
require unrestricted professional advice and assistance of the highest
quality. Regulators can encourage independent contractors to provide
this advice and assist in achieving the goals of FIRREA by interpreting
the standards narrowly and pursuing independent contractors only for
misconduct involving intentional or knowing activity, or other mis-
conduct of an extremely serious nature. Such an approach, if con-
sistently applied, would communicate to independent contractors that
the risks present under FIRREA are manageable as long as they ex-
ercise ordinary professional care and any potential misconduct does
not rise above the level of mere negligence.
Independent contractors will be able to develop more effective
internal procedures if regulators apply the standards consistently. Con-
versely, an inconsistent and unclear approach, in which regulators pur-
181. See House Report, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
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sue independent contractors for both serious misconduct and
misconduct that arguably is merely negligent, may discourage inde-
pendent contractors from accepting financial institution engagements
for fear of possible FIRREA liability. One commentator has suggested
that the greatly increased potential for sanctions under FIRREA will
cause a lack of availability of liability insurance for individuals as-
sociated with financial institutions, and that many liability insurance
issuers now are adding exclusion clauses in insurance contracts to ex-
clude coverage on claims brought by a regulatory agency. 182 Although
the commentator's observations were directed primarily at liability in-
surance of directors and officers, a similar situation may occur in the
field of malpractice insurance for attorneys, accountants, and other
independent contractors, further inhibiting and discouraging their par-
ticipation in this field. This will deprive the financial institutions most
in need-those failing or troubled-of the competent professional help
they require. It will be important, however, for the regulatory agencies
to enforce the FIRREA standards promptly and consistently when se-
rious misconduct of the type contemplated by FIRREA has occurred.
Prompt enforcement action against independent contractors engaging
in intentional, reckless, or knowing misconduct is necessary to coun-
teract effectively any tendency on the part of independent contractors
to overzealously support (and thereby please) prominent (and often
high-fee-paying) clients. Judge Sporkin alluded to such a tendency in
the recent Lincoln Savings and Loan ruling.183 Judge Sporkin ad-
monished Lincoln's accountants for failing to exercise adequate skep-
ticism of allegedly fraudulent transactions entered into by its client.18
Consequently, regulators are forced to walk a tightrope in applying
the FIRREA enforcement standards. On the one hand, an overly ex-
pansive enforcement approach on the part of the regulators may serve
to deter and inhibit the quality of representation by independent con-
tractors needed by failing and troubled institutions. On the other hand,
a sufficiently stringent enforcement policy is needed to deter over-
zealous representation of clients by independent contractors.
(2) Regulating in a Changing Environment
In applying the FIRREA standards, regulators also should rec-
ognize the changed environment under which FIRREA is operating.
182. Comment, Civil Money Penalties in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989: An Analysis, 12 Gao. MASON U.L. REv. 289, 308-09 (1990) (authored
by Elizabeth McLaughlin).
183. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Under prior law, the relaxed environment of deregulation gave fi-
nancial institutions much leeway in their operations. Consequently,
independent contractors providing services to financial institutions were
more likely to encounter and become involved in transactions or ac-
tivities that arguably were permissible under the then current law, but
that were later found to be unsafe or unsound. Indeed, independent
contractors such as CPAs frequently warned regulators of the dangers
of deregulation.185 Deregulation often is cited as one of the principal
reasons for the savings and loan crisis. 8 6
Under FIRREA, financial institutions will be operating under a
much more constrained set of rules. Capital, liquidity, and other stan-
dards have been tightened 87 and insiders, such as officers and direc-
tors, now face greater exposure to liability for their misconduct.' 8  In
this restrictive environment, independent contractors will be less likely
to encounter the level of risky practices that existed under prior law.
Regulators should recognize that the stringent operating standards, as
well as the excessive penalty provisions established by FIRREA, will
have a natural tendency to suppress the frequency of risky practices
and that liberal application of the enforcement provisions available
against independent contractors therefore is less necessary.
(3) Regulating Under the Guidelines of Legislative History
Although the instructions of congressional committees that did
not become part of the statute do not have the force of law, they do
provide guidance on the intended application of FIRREA and thus
should be followed by the regulators as closely as possible. The leg-
islative history of FIRREA provides support for the position that re-
gulators should not regard the inclusion of independent contractors
in the FIRREA statute as a directive to pursue independent contractors
for anything but the most serious misconduct. 18 9
Conclusion
The risk environment in which attorneys, accountants, appraisers,
and other independent contractors serving financial institutions op-
185. Failure of Independent CPA's to Identify Fraud, Waste and Mismanagement and
Assure Accurate Financial Position of Troubled S&L's before the House Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1989) (statement of Philip Chenok,
President, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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erate has changed dramatically with the passage of FIRREA. The Act
expressly includes independent contractors (including attorneys, ac-
countants, and appraisers) as targets of its enforcement powers. The
potential penalties that can be levied upon a party violating the FIR-
REA enforcement provisions have been increased drastically over those
available under prior law.
Independent contractors must demonstrate a higher level of cul-
pability than directors, officers, and other insiders before being sub-
jected to FIRREA's enforcement provisions. An independent
contractor's misconduct must be found reckless or knowing. This mis-
conduct must lead to more than minimal financial loss or have a sig-
nificant adverse effect on the institution.
The terminology used in FIRREA's enforcement provisions re-
lating to independent contractors is vague and ambiguous and has not
been clarified by legislative history, regulations, or judicial decisions.
Consequently, independent contractors desiring to avoid liability un-
der FIRREA face a challenge in developing adequate procedures to
protect themselves. Among the procedures that independent contrac-
tors should consider are the establishment of a financial institution
quality control committee to review and monitor client pr6jects and
more stringent screening requirements for potential financial institu-
tion clients. Independent contractors should carefully follow the de-
velopment of regulations or judicial decisions in this area and adjust
their internal control procedures accordingly,
In addition, regulators faced with the task of interpreting and
implementing the FIRREA standards should give the statute a narrow
interpretation. This will prevent any chilling effect on effective pro-
fessional assistance and encourage the participation of competent
professionals in the resolution of the savings and loan crisis.
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